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Resumen: ¿Qué influencia  a  un Estado pequeño a  decidirse  a  sumarse a  un  proceso de
integración económica? Los esfuerzos de integración y reunificación de los últimos 15 años
en el territorio de la ex Unión Soviética finalmente dieron resultado con la decisión de Rusia
de poner fin a su aislamiento. En Europa del Este la Unión Económica Euroasiática se ha
convertido en una alternativa a la Unión Europa y en un centro de gravedad. Los esfuerzos de
expansión de la Unión Económica Euroasiática en Europa del Este han comenzado a chocar
con la política de expansión de la Unión Europea. Para muchos países de Asia Central, la
Unión Económica Euroasiática también ha emergido como una alternativa. El artículo analiza
los  posibles  efectos  positivos  y  negativos  del  acceso  de  Kirguistán  a  la  Unión  Aduanera
Euroasiática. Como resultados positivos, aumentará el comercio con los países de la Unión
Aduanera Euroasiática y los ingresos aduaneros, la seguridad fronteriza será asegurada y las
inversiones y las remesas laborales crecerán. Entre los efectos negativos se encuentran el
desempleo y el aumento de los precios de los bienes de consumo, debido a la pérdida del
carácter re-exportador de Kirguistán. La hipótesis de este artículo es que Kirguistán decidió
unirse a la Unión Aduanera Euroasiática debido a su dependencia respecto de Rusia, a sus
preocupaciones securitarias, a su temor a China y debido a la continua hegemonía cultural
rusa. A pesar de las negativas consecuencias económicas, la participación de Kirguistán en la
Unión Aduanera Euroasiática es concebida como una decisión política debida a la ausencia
de  otras  alternativas.
Abstract: What  does  influence a  small  state  its  decision  to  join an economic  integration
process? The last fifteen years re-unification and integration efforts in the territory of the
former Soviet Union finally yielded results with Russia's reassertion putting an end to its
isolation. In Eastern Europe the Eurasian Economic Union has become an alternative to the
European  Union  and  a  center  of  gravity.  Eurasian  Economic  Union  expansion  efforts  in
Eastern  Europe have started to clash  with the European Union's  enlargement  policy.  For
many  Central  Asian  countries,  the  Eurasian  Economic  Union  has  also  emerged  as  an
alternative.  This  article analyzes the possible positive and negative effects of  Kyrgyzstan's
accession  to  the  Eurasian  Customs  Union.  As  positive  results,  trade  with  the  Eurasian
Customs  Union  countries  and  customs  revenues  will  increase,  border  security  will  be
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ensured, investment and the labor remittances will increase. Among negative effects are the
unemployment and the rise in prices of the consumer goods, due to the loss of Kyrgyzstan’s
re-exporter character. The thesis of this paper is that Kyrgyzstan decided to join the Eurasian
Customs Union because its dependence on Russia, its security concerns, its fear of China, and
because of the continuation of Russia’s cultural hegemony. Despite the negative economic
consequences,  Kyrgyzstan’s  participation in the Eurasian Customs Union is conceived as a
political decision due to the absence of other alternatives.
Palabras clave: Pequeños Estados; Unión Económica Euroasiática; Integración económica, 
Kirguistán. 
Keywords: Small States, Eurasian Economic Union, Economic Integration, Kyrgyzstan.
1. Introduction
In 2010, with the establishment of the Eurasian Customs Union and its becoming into
an Eurasian Economic Union in January 2015,  a new reality emerged in Eurasia in terms of
regionalization.  This has changed the balance for the European Union and countries in the
region, forcing the former and NATO to pay attention. Although the continued appealing of
the European Union for neighboring countries, for many others -especially the Central Asian
countries-, the Eurasian Economic Union has proved itself as an alternative. 
The United States openly declared its opposition to it, with former Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton stating that the initiative aims to revive the Soviet Union and that the US
would not allow it. “There is a move to re-Sovietize the region” -the former US secretary of
state asserted- “but let's make no mistake about it: we know what the goal is and we are
trying to figure out effective ways to slow down or prevent it” (Clover, 2012). In this context,
Kazakhstan’s leader Nursultan Nazarbayev has invited Turkey to consider joining the Eurasian
Union in order to refute the claims that the Eurasian Economic Union is some sort of revival
of the Soviet Union. 
Since the Soviet Union's disintegration, its member states have made several attempts
to regroup under a new union. These efforts have led to several high level meetings and to
the  signature  of several  international agreements. However,  they  have been  largely
unfruitful. During  the  1990s,  the newly  independent states  had  to deal  with  internal
problems and, in particular,  Russia's institutional  weaknesses have hampered  efforts to go
beyond the good wishes for integration. The European Union took advantage of this situation
and expanded to include the Baltic States, signing several partnership agreements with six
countries of the former Soviet Union, including Ukraine. 
However, Russia, freed from inner turmoil under the leadership of Vladimir Putin since
the 2000s, has started to show interest in the former Soviet territory again. In this context,
with the establishment of the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) the first serious international
institutionalization in the former Soviet territory has been realized. Unlike previous attempts,
ECU has completed the institutionalization and has been working -albeit with some difficulty-
during the transition process. Thus, it was recognized by the World Trade Organization and
other international institutions as a legal entity. More importantly, the ECU is clearly seen by
Russia as a tool for re-integration of the former Soviet Union countries. Modeled after the
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European Union, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) was intended to provide an alternative
model, particularly to Eastern Europe. This way, the EEU entered the competition with the
European Union over the countries of the former Soviet Union,  as seen in the example of
Ukraine. The competition was carried out to the extent that the Association Agreement with
the European Union was canceled and Ukraine was dragged into turmoil.
From the perspective of Central Asia, the situation seems to be different from that of
Eastern Europe.  Kazakhstan, the region's most important and richest country, is already a
founding member of the EEU. Regarding Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the poorest countries of
the region, the  absence of an alternative such as the European Union made Putin's work
much easier. Moreover, both countries are so dependent on Russia that they do not conceive
any other choice. In consequence, they have been the founding members of the Eurasian
Economic Community (EurAsEC), established in 2000. 
Nonetheless, EEU membership has been far from being an easy choice for Kyrgyzstan
because it is economically not feasible and it is predicted to cause losses, at least in the short
term. Compared with the other Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan has been member of the
World Trade Organization (WTO)  since 1997,  becoming  a  re-exporter hub through which
goods from China, Russia and the rest of the Central Asian countries are distributed. Dordoy
and  Alamedin bazaars  in  Bishkek and  Karasu  bazaar  in  Osh have  become  the largest
wholesale bazaars in Central Asia. 
With the entrance to the EEU, Kyrgyzstan will lose this status. The debate on the pros
and  cons of joining  this  organization  has  divided the  Kyrgyz  society and  delayed  its
membership.  Clearly, the  latter  was  the  willing  of  the  Kyrgyz  government. However,
Kyrgyzstan finally signed the agreement to join the Union in January 1st, 2015. It has not
been easy for the Kyrgyzstan’s government to decide it. For example, the President Almazbek
Atambaayev  stated in a  speech in October  27th:  “We are  choosing the lesser  evil  — no
offense to the member states of this organization”3. He did not mention what the major evil
was. 
Thus, the research puzzle is why Kyrgyzstan agreed to join the Eurasian Customs Union
despite the predicted economic loses. In order to answer, we have to consider non-economic
variables.  The thesis of this paper is that,  for small states,  other factors such as,  security
concerns, cultural hegemony, and leadership, play the strongest role in explaining why they
join  economic  unions,  despite  them  being  economically  unviable.  In  this  framework,
Kyrgyzstan decided to join the Eurasian Customs Union due to its dependence on Russia, its
security concerns, its fear of China, and the continuation of Russia’s cultural hegemony. In its
first section, the article focuses on small states and their economic integration choices. In its
second section, it analyzes Kyrgyzstan’s reasons to join the Eurasian Economic Union. 
3 “Kyrgyz President Says Customs Union Membership Necessary”, Radio Free Europe, October 27, 2014. 
Available at http://www.rferl.org/content/atambaev-customs-union-kazakhstan-russia-belarus-2015-
joining/26659007.html. Accessed on December 2014. 
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2. Small States and Economic Integration. 
a. What is a Small State?
The international system is comprised of states with different sizes, populations and
histories. It is generally agreed that the state system started with the Peace of Westphalia
(1648) and continues today. These set of agreements initiated a new system of political order
in central Europe, later called Westphalian sovereignty, based upon the concept of co-existing
sovereign states. Currently there are 206 states, 193 of which constitute the United Nations
and two more having an observer  status.  Because of  uneven historical  developments  all
states are unique in terms of history, political and economic structures, level of development,
social and ethnic composition, and culture. Therefore, states have been classified as large and
small states.
There is no agreement in specialized literature about what makes a state to be a small
one. The general attitude is that we can’t define a small state, but we know when we see
one. ‘Small states’ have been defined in contrast to their larger neighbors, with respect to
their economic structure and their domestic policy-making frameworks and to their different
performance in security policy, in international relations and in international organizations. 
However, scholars have also tried to define small states per se. Thus, two definitional
approaches have been adopted: one based on objective criteria and another on subjective
ones. 
According to the first  approach,  small  states are characterized by their  very limited
resources,  mainly  a  little  population,  a  poor Gross  Domestic Product  (GDP),  and a  small
territory (Kelstrup, 1993: 140). There are different views with respect to the population cut-
off point for small states Some scholars affirm that states with a population of less than 10
million people can be described as small ones (Goetschel, 1998). Others characterize as small
states with a less than 3 million population (Pace, 2000). For its part, the World Bank Report
(2000) takes a 1.5 million population as the cut-off point to define a small state. Nonetheless,
the report concludes “no definition, whether it be population, geographical size or GDP, is
likely  to  be  fully  satisfactory.  In  practice  there  is  a  continuum,  with  states  larger  than
whatever threshold is chosen sharing some or all of the characteristics of smaller countries”
(Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank, 2000: 2).
The second approach to the definition of  small  states is  based on more subjective
criteria. According to this latter, states can be small in terms of resources but they can have
power and influence anyway. For example, Netherlands’s total area is only 41,543  km2, but
its nominal GDP is of 880.394 billion dollars, which makes it 16th largest in the world. This
country exerts more power than its size, especially in the field of international law, being the
host  of  several  international  courts  at  Hague,  such  as the International  Court  of  Justice.
Besides, as Beechler asserts, “Small state characterizes a specific state’s position towards its
environment  which  is  characterized  by  certain  deficiency  in  influence  and  in  autonomy
relative to large powers” (Beechler, 1998: 127). For example, Mongolia, with a total area of
1,564,115.75 km2,  has  a  poor  influence in  international  affairs,  with  a  population of  2.9
million people and a nominal GDP of 11.516 billion dollars. 
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Being a small state also influences states’ integration choices as part of their foreign
policy  decisions.  Therefore,  small  states’  reasons  for  being  members  of  a  regional
organization are different from those of large states.
b. Small states’ integration decision. 
Why small states decide to join or refrain from joining regional integration? Literature
largely focuses on the European Union integration and identifies three main reasons for a
small state to join regional integrations: economy, politics, and security. 
The first dimension is the economic one: small states want to take advantage of being
part of a large market. As Nugent states, 
Because  of  the  small  size  of  their  productive  capacities  and  domestic
markets, small states normally have a higher ratio of trade in goods and
services than large states. This heavy dependence on external trade -and in
particular  the  dependence  on  external  outlets  for  (usually  specialized)
domestic output-  results  in  small  states  usually  being  very  interested in
preferential trading arrangements with trading partners (Nugent, 2001: 6).
The second set of reasons for joining a regional integration process is the political one.
Keohane (1969) classified states in terms of their power and influence in the international
system, resulting in: system-determining states, system-influencing states,  system-affecting
states and system-ineffectual states. Since many small states are in the latter category and
lack political power and influence, they prefer to be a part of a larger entity. As Nugent states,
“Being part of the emerging European superpower, and helping to shape its relations with
the rest of the world, is an additional political attraction for many EU applicants” (Nugent,
2001: 5). Moreover, small states have disproportionally bigger influence in the working and
decision making mechanisms of regional organizations. 
Finally, a third set of reasons to look for joining regional integration projects belongs to
the security dimension. In the case of the European Union, “ the EU does not of course,
provide hard security in the manner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but it is
seen by most, if not all,  current applicants as offering useful soft security protection and
comfort” (Nugent, 2001: 5). 
On top of these three sets of reasons I also include cultural and leadership and political
elite dimensions as I hypothesize in the following section. Although economic and political
reasons are important in integration decisions, cultural affinity between member states are
also important. For example, European Union members are all Christian. This is often argued
as one of the reasons why Turkey has not been admitted to the union. Cultural hegemony of
a powerful state in a union also influences the potential members’ decisions to join the union
as in the case of Eurasian Economic Union. 
The last dimension is related to the political elite and leadership’s instinct to protect
their  power  which  is  called  omnibalancing.  As  Sari  states,  “Omnibalancing  is  based  on
containing  both  the  needs  of  leaders  to  balance  against  any  immediate  threat  (internal
and/or external) and the need to appease secondary threats in order to stay in power” (Sari,
2008: 17).
c. Hypotheses.
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In this study I reflect on why Kyrgyzstan, as small state, decided to join the Eurasian
Customs Union despite its economic unfeasibility.  Thus,  the study’s dependent variable is
Kyrgyzstan’s decision to join the regional organization. To explain this phenomenon, I propose
the following independent variables: dependency on Russia, economic weakness, willingness
to  access  a  larger  market,  Russia’s  cultural  hegemony,  bandwagoning  affect,  security
concerns, and fear of China. 
I am testing the following hypotheses, organized under five headings. 
The first set of hypotheses is economic in nature:
 If integration is economically feasible, states want to join integration.
 Because  small  states  have  small  domestic  market,  external  trade  constitutes  an
important  portion  of  the  GDP.  Therefore,  small  states  seek  preferential  trade
agreements and economic integration.
 If  a  small  state  is  economically  dependent  on  a  powerful  state,  is  easy  to  take  an
integration decision. 
The second set of hypotheses is related to the political dimension:
 Since small states lack political power and influence, they try to gain more power by
being part of a larger union.
 Small states have disproportionally a louder voice in the decision making mechanisms
as part of a union. Therefore, joining an economic union is attractive for small states.
The third set of hypotheses is related to security: 
 If a country is located in a peaceful area, integration decision is purely economic -such
as Norway’s decision not to join the EU. However, if a state is located in a not so safe
area, security concerns play a role in integration decisions.
 Small states have two options with respect to security decisions. The first is to stay
neutral or to find a powerful friend (bandwagoning). If there is a sense of a security
threat nearby, small states choose bandwagoning. 
The fourth set of hypotheses reflects the cultural aspects of the integration decisions:
 If a small  country is under the influence of the ideological  hegemony of a powerful
state, it is easier to make a decision of integration. 
 If integration sounds like returning to good old days, making the integration decision is
easier. 
The last set of hypotheses is related to leadership and political elite:
 If leadership is concerned with consolidation of power and potential integration would
help, it will be easier to take integration choices.
In the following section, I test these hypotheses for Kyrgyzstan after putting forward
evidence of why Kyrgyzstan can be defined as a small state. 
3. Kyrgyzstan and the Eurasian Economic Union.
d. Kyrgyzstan as a Small State.
Conceived both from an objective and from a subjective criteria Kyrgyzstan is a small
country.  In  terms  of  the  former,  Kyrgyzstan  is  a  poor,  landlocked,  mountainous  country,
whose total  area is of  199.9 km2, being the 86th in the world in size. According to 2014
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estimates, its population is about 5.7 million people, the 112th in the world. Its nominal GDP
is about 5.9 billion dollars and its GDP per capita is around 1,070 dollars. After the collapse of
the Soviet Union, its industrial production decreased substantially. 
In terms of subjective criteria, Kyrgyzstan also perceives itself as small and weak. It is
not in a position of influencing its environment, but it is influenced by it. Surrounded by large
and populous countries such as China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russia, Kyrgyzstan feels
threatened by its neighbors, thus looking for alliances and security guarantees.
Although the Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank aforementioned report does not
include Kyrgyzstan as a small state, the characteristics which it identifies as having important
implications for development are also shared by Kyrgyzstan:
Remoteness and insularity. Kyrgyzstan is a mountainous landlocked country located in
the heart of Asia. 
Susceptibility to natural disasters.  Most small states are in regions frequently affected
by adverse climatic and other natural events which, typically, affect their entire population
and their economies. Kyrgyzstan has long and harsh winters and its growing season is short.
Limited institutional capacity. Having experienced two revolutions and a bloody ethnic
conflict in the last 10 years, Kyrgyzstan has been struggling to provide basic public services as
education and social services, justice, and security, as well as basic goods to its population.
The state is incapable of collecting taxes and providing services and is infected with high
levels of corruption.
Limited  diversification.  Because  of  its  lacking  of  resources  and  its  small  domestic
market,  Kyrgyzstan’s  economy  is  undiversified,  both  in  its  production  and  exportations.
Economy is basically dependent on mining income from the Kumtor Gold mine and labor
remittances. 
Openness. Because of the small size of its economy, Kyrgyzstan relies on external trade
with China,  Russia  and Central  Asia  and on foreign  investment  in  order  to  overcome its
inherent small scale and limited resources. 
Access  to  external  capital.  Access  to  global  capital  markets  has  been  difficult  for
Kyrgyzstan because it has been conceived as being risky due to its instability and lack of rule
of law.
Poverty. Its  levels of poverty are quite high and its income distribution very uneven
(Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank, 2000: 2).
e. The Economic Dimension.
The first hypothesis to be tested is that if integration is economically feasible, states
want to join it. There are many advantages of joining the Eurasian Customs Union: Trade with
the Eurasian Customs Union countries makes customs revenues increase; border security is
ensured; investment and labor remittances increase. For their part, disadvantages of joining
the Eurasian Customs Union can also be pointed: Kyrgyzstan loses its re-exporter character
leading to the weakening of their Dordoi, Karasu and Alamadin bazaars and to the increasing
of the unemployment rate; prices of the consumer goods rise because of the increasing of
custom tariffs. As a conclusion, for Kyrgyzstan economic disadvantages of joining the ECU
outweigh the advantages. Therefore, the first hypothesis cannot be confirmed.
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The second hypothesis  asserted  is  that  because small  states  have a  little  domestic
market, external trade constitutes a higher portion of their GDP; thus, they seek preferential
trade agreements and economic integration. Current Kyrgyzstan’s economy was formed after
its  independence, following  liberal  policies.  It  is  based on trade,  agriculture,  mining  and
services. Kyrgyzstan was one of the first countries to join World Trade Organization (WTO),
becoming a hub for the re-exportation of goods from China, Central Asia and Russia. This
way, Dordoi, Karasu, and Alamadin bazaars have became the largest ones in Central Asia. The
85 % of the imports from China is re-exported to Russia and to Kazakhstan. It is estimated
that  these  bazaars  constitute  a  third  of  Kyrgyzstan’s  GDP  (Payaz,  2014).  Compared  to
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, it lacks valuable energy resources such as oil and natural gas,
being  dependent  on  foreign  investments  in  sectors  such  as  mining:  Kumtor  gold  mine
produces three billion dollars annually. Thus, Kyrgyzstan is also dependent on foreign aid.
If a small state is economically dependent on a powerful state, it is easier to take an
integration decision. According to data  of the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz
Republic  reproduced  in  Table  1,  half of Kyrgyzstan's  imports  and  exports  are  with  the
Eurasian Economic Union member states, especially with Kazakhstan and Russia. While 13%
of  Kyrgyzstan's exports go to Russia, Russia has a share of 33.2% of imports. Subsidized oil
from Moscow constitutes the bulk of the imports, which makes non-oil Kyrgyzstan dependent
on cheap oil from Russia.  Kazakhstan is the second country in Kyrgyzstan’s exports with a
24.1% share, while it explains 9.7% of its imports. 
f. Table 1. 2012 Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Trade partners. 
Exports   Imports  
1 Switzerland 32.6 1 Russia 33.2
2 Kazakhstan 24.1 2 China 22.5
3 Russia 13.0 3 Kazakhstan 9.7
4 Uzbekistan 11.3 4 USA 4.7
5 China 3.6 5 Japan 4.0
6 Turkey 3.0 6 Germany 3.7
7 Turkmenistan 2.4 7 Turkey 3.3
8 Afghanistan 1.5 8 Belarus 3.0
9 Germany 1.0 9 Ukraine 2.6
10 United Arab Emirates 1.0 10 South Korea 1.7
Source: Kyrgyz Republic Central Bank Bulletin, Number 5, 2013. 
Kyrgyzstan’s  economy  also  relies  heavily  on  remittances  from  foreign  workers.  The
participation of labor remittances in its GDP is of 40%, being the second highest in the world,
after its  neighbor Tajikistan.  It  is  estimated that close  to 500,000 Kyrgyz  citizens work  in
Russia and another  200,000 in  Kazakhstan,  most  of  which  illegally.  According  to  Russian
official  data, only 133,  500 Kyrgyz citizens have received official  work  permits.  The main
reason of illegal work is that obtaining permission to work legally implies a long and difficult
procedure. The expatriate worker’s fear of deportation has been a big concern for Kyrgyz
politicians in making the decision of joining the Eurasian Economic Union. 
g. Political and Security Dimensions
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There  are  several  political  reasons  for  Kyrgyzstan  to  join  the  Russia-led  Eurasian
Economic Union. First,  many Kyrgyz citizens entering the AGB terms means the return of
safety period of the Soviet Union. Although it has been stated by Eurasian Economic Union
leaders, especially Nazarbayev, that the union is only economic in nature, it has been accused
of being a revival of the Soviet Union. Since small states lack political power and influence
they try to gain more power by being a part of a larger union. Kyrgyzstan was a member of
the Soviet Union and 95.98% of its population voted in favor of remaining in a referendum
on the future of the Soviet Union held on the 17th March 19914. 
Second, since Kyrgyzstan is dependent on Russia in many aspects, it has no political
power  or  will  to  go  against  Moscow’s  requests.  Staying  out  of  the  union  would  mean
loneliness and isolation which Kyrgyzstan cannot afford. 
Third, Kyrgyzstan has good relations with and looks up to Kazakhstan in many political
issues. Since Kazakhistan is one of the founding members of the Eurasian Economic Union, it
is hard for Kyrgyzstan to stay out of it. 
Finally, Russia is the only power to balance China after the US withdrawal from Central
Asia. So, there is no alternative for Kyrgyzstan. In contrast to Eastern Europe, the European
Union is far and is not a viable alternative for Central Asia (Avcu, 2014). 
Kyrgyzstan’s  security  concerns  also  played  a  role  in  deciding  to  join  the  Eurasian
Customs Union. As hypothesized above, if a country is located in a peaceful area the decision
to join an integration process is purely economic. However, if a state is located in a not very
secure area, security concerns play a role in integration decisions. Kyrgyzstan is located in a
not very secure part of the world. There are border and enclave-exclave problems with its
neighbors  which causes  occasional  conflicts.  There are also problems related  to rivers in
Kyrgyzstan  and Uzbekistan.  Indeed,  Uzbekistan  President  Islam Karimov once stated  that
water issues could be a reason for war in Central Asia. Because of security threats like these,
Kyrgyzstan does not have an option to stay neutral and it chooses bandwagoning with Russia.
4. Cultural Hegemony
If a small country is under the influence of ideological hegemony from a powerful state,
it  is  easier  to make an integration decision.  After the collapse of the Soviet  Union, each
country in Central Asia was obliged to define its relation with Russia.  Each country faced
similar demographic pressure due to the existence of large ethnic Russian minorities and
domestic and foreign economic pressures. 
However,  Central  Asian  countries  did  not  pursue  similar  national  strategies  in  the
cultural sphere. Some countries, such as Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, clearly wanted to break
Russia’s cultural hegemony. Thus, they changed their alphabets and left the usage of Russian
as an official language. Meanwhile, other countries, such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, have
not attempted to eliminate Russia’s cultural hegemony –even, in some cases, they were not
aware of its existence. This way, they have kept the Cyrillic alphabet and continued using and
teaching the Russian language at schools. Thus, for Kyrgyz public and its political elite, joining
4 “Sowjetunion, 17 März 1991 : Weiterbestand Der UdSSRAls Föderation Gleichberechtigter Und Souveräner 
Staaten”. Available at: http://www.sudd.ch/event.php?lang=en&id=su011991. Accessed on June 2014.
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an economic union with Russia is not a foreign concept as for most it means the return to
better days. Underlying this sentiment there is some sort of nostalgia for the Soviet Union.
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h. Omnibalancing. 
If  the leaders are concerned about consolidation of  power and think that potential
integration will help in that task, it will be easier to make an integration choice. This is called
omnibalancing. Kyrgyzstan is the only country in Central Asia in which leadership has changed
hands with revolution. In 2005, a popular uprising resulted in the toppling the first president
of  the  country,  Askar  Akayev.  In  2010,  a  similar  process  was  repeated  and Bakiyev  was
removed from power. 
In this second revolution, Russia’s influence was apparent.  Bakiyev had promised to
close down the American Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan after receiving 2.15 billion dollars of aid
by Russia, but he changed his mind after America increased its rental payment. As a result,
Russian  media  began  to  openly  criticize  Bakiyev  and  increased  the  oil  price  sale  to
Kyrgyzystan. Thus, utility prices rised and caused the irruption of demonstrations. This was
the beginning of Bakiyev regime’s fall. Current President Almazbek Atambayev is determined
to  not  repeat  the  mistakes  Bakiyev  made  and  has  improved  Kyrsgyzstan’s  relation  with
Russia.
5. Conclusion. 
Small  states act differently than large states in their foreign policy decisions. In this
article  I  tried  to  reflect  on  what  influences  a  small  state  decision  to  join  an  economic
integration process. It has been hypothesized that because small states have small domestic
markets, external trade constitutes the most part of their GDP. Therefore, small states seek
preferential trade agreements and economic integration. Thus, small  states decide to join
economic integration processes if they are beneficial for them. However, sometimes small
states decide to join economic integration processes even if it is not economically feasible for
them to do so. 
Kyrgyzstan signed the agreement on its accession to the Eurasian Economic Union on
December 23rd 2014. The EEU represents some economic benefits for  the Asian country
such as  the increase of  trade with  the Eurasian  Customs Union’s  countries  and customs
revenues,  the  improvement  of  border  security,  and  the  rise  in  investment  and  labor
remittances. Nonetheless, there are some economic disadvantages as well. Among negative
effects I underlined unemployment and the rise in the consumer goods’ prices as a result of
Kyrgyzstan  losing  its  re-exporter  character.  I  concluded  that  the  economic  disadvantages
outweigh the advantages of joining the Union. 
Therefore, I had to look for other (political, security related, cultural, and leadership)
variables  in  order  to  explain  its  decision  to  enter  the  integration  process.  This  way,  I
concluded that due to Kyrgyzstan’s dependence on Russia, its security concerns, its fear of
China, and the continuation of Russia’s cultural  hegemony, Kyrgyzstan decided to join the
Eurasian Economic Union.
What  does  this  decision  means  in  terms  of  International  Relations  theory?  Which
theory explains Kyrgyzstan’s decision better, Liberalism, Realism or Constructivism? Although
economic integrations are the area of Liberalism and the increase of economic unions prove
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that liberals are right. However, the consideration of other factors in Kyrgyzstan’s decision,
such as security concerns, cultural factors, and leadership role forces us to consider realism
and constructivism as well.
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